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1 The Directive
In this issue of Erasmus Law Review, the focus is on a particularly interesting piece of 
EU legislation, the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.1
 The UCP Directive has the ambitious aim of preventing distortion of consumer 
contracting choice-making, in particular with regard to contract decisions prior to 
conclusion of a contract and decisions to exercise existing contractual rights. The 
Directive is of a generic nature and is not limited to specific sectors of economic activity. 
In principle, any business-to-consumer contract is covered by the Directive. It contains 
core provisions on unfair commercial practices, a black list of practices deemed unfair, 
and dedicated rules on various topics such as Codes of Conduct and the relationship 
with various information duties in other EU legislation.
 The core of the Directive lies in the prohibition of practices contrary to the requirements 
of professional diligence which materially distort or are likely to materially distort the 
economic behaviour of the average (targeted) consumer with regard to a product or 
service.2 The concept of ‘unfair practices’ is further subcategorized into misleading and 
aggressive practices.
 Misleading practices are divided into two categories:
1) Utterances which contain incorrect information and are therefore untruthful 
or which in any way deceive or are likely to deceive the average consumer, 
even if the information is factually correct. Such practices cause distortion 
of the transactional decision-making process of the average consumer in 
relation to aspects such as the existence or nature of the product, fitness for 
purpose, usage, quantity, specification, the price or the manner in which 
the price is calculated, the need for a service, part, replacement or repair, 
etcetera.3
2) The practice of omitting or hiding material information – including the 
provision of such information in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous 
or untimely manner – that the average consumer needs, according to 
the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thus causing 
distortion of the transactional decision-making process of this average 
consumer.4
Aggressive are those practices that engage in actual harassment, coercion, the use of 
physical force or the use of more subtle techniques involving undue influence such 
as exploitation of vulnerability or the use of obstacles discouraging consumers from 
asserting their rights.5 For example, artificially raising barriers to exit from a contract or 
to the exercise of contractual rights may constitute an unfair commercial practice.
 In addition to the core provisions on misleading and aggressive practices, Annex I 
to the Directive consists of a ‘black list’ of certain practices deemed unfair under any 
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circumstances.6 For example, a commercial practice ‘describing a product as “gratis”, 
“free”, “without charge” or similar, if the consumer has to pay anything other than the 
unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for 
delivery of the item’.7
2 The Issues
The Directive has been implemented in the EU Member States and some years have 
passed since its entry into force. Therefore, an assessment of the experiences with the 
Directive is in order. It seems that there are a number of issues that deserve further 
exploration.
 First, there is the maximum harmonization character of the Directive which precludes 
Member States from amending the ‘black list’ of unfair practices. Does this affect or 
interfere with the effective regulation of country-specific unfair practices? How far 
does the maximum harmonisation nature of the Directive reach, given the exclusion 
of certain sectors (e.g., financial services) and general rules of contract law (e.g., rules 
on fraud, mistake and misrepresentation) from the suffocating clinch of maximum 
harmonization?8
 Secondly, there is the tension between protection and consumer responsibility. 
On the one hand, the Directive aims at protecting consumers against unfair practices 
while on the other it underlines the individual’s responsibility by reference to the 
average consumer. According to standing case law, the ‘reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect’ consumer can be expected to make a serious 
effort at collecting and understanding all available information on essential aspects of 
a contract.9 The ‘average consumer’ is neither easily impressed nor quickly deceived. 
National courts applying this standard may find themselves offering less protection to 
consumers than they were used to under pre-existing national protective frameworks.
 Thirdly, there are enforcement issues. The Directive itself gently admonishes the 
Member States to introduce adequate and effective means of enforcement.10 As always, 
penalties must be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.11 It was left to the Member 
States to consider the appropriate enforcement system, ranging from private law, 
administrative law to criminal law. How is the Directive actually enforced? How do the 
local enforcement strategies work out in practice?
 Fourthly, there is the question how the Directive has impacted on business marketing 
and sales practices. Such impact is likely to be indirect, namely, only felt when and to 
the extent courts and supervisory agencies are both willing and able to enforce the UCP 
framework. What has the experience been in this area? Has the UCP Directive been 
used ferociously or has it turned out to be a backwater of a niche in law?
 Finally, one can ask what the added value of the UCP Directive is. At the end of the 
day, does the Directive add much to the pre-existing national regulatory frameworks 
and has it had notable impact on practice and theory? Are there any ramifications for 
private law theories of contract?
6 See Art. 5(5) in conjunction with Annex I of the UCP Directive. 
7 See Ann. I, no. 20 of the UCP Directive.
8 Exceptions to the maximum harmonisation regime include the following. Art. 3(2) states that the 
Directive is without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation or 
effect of a contract. Art. 3 (9) allows more restrictive national rules in the area of financial services. Art. 3(4) 
gives priority to specific EU rules over the UCP Directive in case of conflict.
9 ECJ 16 July 1998, C-210/96 (Gut Springenheide); ECJ 19 September 2006, C-356/04 (Lidl and 
Colruyt); cf. ECJ 6 July 1995, C-470/93, Jur. 1995 p. I-01923 (Mars).
10 Art. 11 of the UCP Directive provides that the Member States shall ensure that adequate and effective 
means exist to combat unfair commercial practices in order to enforce compliance with the provisions of 
this Directive in the interest of consumers. This includes the duty to allow some sort of collective consumer 
group action before civil or administrative courts.
11 Art. 13 UCP Directive.
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3 The Contributions
These and related issues merit careful consideration by expert scholars in this field. 
Therefore, we are very proud to offer four excellent contributions to this issue of the 
Erasmus Law Review which deal with several of the aforementioned aspects.
 In the first contribution, Koutsias and Willett analyse the English transposition efforts 
and give a general account of how the Directive was treated in terms of enforcement. 
Here, the use of administrative law typology of enforcement orders, the conceptualisation 
of a preventive protection regime and the emphasis on criminal prosecution has shaped 
the English implementation process. The English legislature chose not to attach any 
private law sanctions to unfair commercial practices. Hence, any spill-over effects 
from the Directive into English private law will be highly indirect at best. Koutsias and 
Willett address these issues but they furthermore extend their analysis to the relationship 
between the generic regime of the Directive and sectoral legislation and regulation in the 
domain of financial services, showing the tension between harmonisation and national 
preferences for more protective measures in key areas.
 Keirsbilck goes on to discuss the maximum harmonisation nature of the Directive. 
He does so by focussing on the treatment of sale below cost in European consumer 
and competition law. First, Keirsbilck discusses the well-known line of ECJ case law 
(e.g., Oosthoek, Keck and Mithouard).12 Then, he reviews initiatives for a regulation 
at the European level, followed by the current position under the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive. The position seems to be that the Directive does not allow national 
prohibitions of sales below cost if and to the extent that such national prohibitions aim at 
consumer protection. This would interfere with the Directive’s all-encompassing scope 
of maximum harmonisation, or so the ECJ holds.13 Keirsbilck argues, however, that 
from a European competition law point of view, stricter national rules are not always 
as suspect as the UCP Directive seems to suggest. Clearly, any divergence of EU 
competition law and consumer law on this point seems undesirable.
 Pavillon addresses the treatment of private initiatives of quality regulation through 
voluntary Codes of Conduct and the UCP Directive. The Directive has a two-way 
approach to such Codes: the Directive can help to sustain, amplify and enforce such 
voluntary arrangements – for instance, by holding traders who publicly undertake to 
operate in accordance with a particular Code to account for violations – and it can 
penalize the drafting and operation of ‘dodgy codes’ that provoke unfair commercial 
practices. Pavillon analyses the policy path walked by the European policymakers and 
the underlying rationale of promoting the use of honest and ‘fairness enhancing’ Codes. 
She also draws attention to the fact that existing Codes may need to be adjusted in 
light of the Directive. Pavillon’s assessment of the current situation is that the Directive 
has not had a noticeable impact on existing Codes, that the ideal of having Europe-
wide Codes in particular areas has not been attained by the Directive and that national 
ADR boards such as the English Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) may entertain 
diverging interpretations of what constitutes ‘unfair’, ‘misleading’ and ‘aggressive’ 
practices. Here, the author in fact touches upon an inherent weakness of the Directive 
(and in any Directive, for that matter). Where interpretation and application of EU rules 
by local authorities and courts differ, true harmonization is not easily achieved.
 Finally, Weber addresses the multitude of enforcement strategies at national level in 
terms of economic efficiency. By applying a law and economics analysis to the case of 
misleading advertising, Weber offers a comprehensive explanation for the differences 
in national enforcement design across the European landscape and a framework for 
evaluating these designs. Weber identifies various behavioural aspects that are of 
relevance in designing enforcement frameworks such as rational apathy, principal-
12 Case C-286/81, Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV, [1982] ECR I-4575; Joined Cases C-267/91 and 
C-268/91, Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097.
13 Cf. the following cases: Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV 
and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV, [2009] ECR I-2949; Case C-304/08, Zentrale zur 
Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH, nyr; Case C-540/08, 
Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG v ‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag GmbH.
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agency issues, capture and the likely responses to (monetary) incentives by individuals, 
companies and enforcement agencies. She also identifies the arguments for individual 
vs. collective enforcement and then goes on to differentiate between two types of 
cases: one where the trader is a fly-by-night operator acting in bad faith and indifferent 
to reputational sanctions, easily terminated, cloaked or fled, and the other where the 
trader is in good faith and who inadvertently breaks the law, uncertain of the applicable 
standards of conduct. Her conclusion is that different mixes of elements of private and 
public law enforcement are necessary to cater for different societal needs. Moreover, the 
two scenarios show that differences in institutional arrangements at national level to a 
large extent predispose the achievable ‘optimal mix’.
4 Final Considerations
With this brief introduction to this issue of the Erasmus Law Review, I hope to have 
shown that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive has both tackled and created 
problems of consumer protection. Among the issues standing out are the problematic 
nature of maximum harmonisation in a not-so-well-defined problem area, the 
unpredictable influence on national private law institutions such as contract, tort and 
self-regulation, and the relative open-endedness of the Directive in relation to the 
methods of enforcement at State level.
 The contributions that follow shed more light on these issues and give guidance for 
future policy-making. For that, the Erasmus Law Review is indebted to the contributors. 
Obviously, our gratitude extends to the reviewers who kindly agreed to perform blind 
reviews of the papers. We hope you enjoy the result.
